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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78A-3-102(4) 
and 78A-4-103(2)G), Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Subsequent a trustor's default on a note connected to a trust deed, may the 
beneficiary of the trust deed "ratify and confirm" action taken on its behalf by a new 
trustee under Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-22(l)(c), where the action being ratified by express 
provision in the substitution of trustee document is the recording of the notice of default 
when that recording took place prior to the recording and execution of the substitution of 
trustee? Preserved: Trial April 19, 2010; Findings and Conclusions, pp. 6-11. 
2. May the new trustee who recorded a notice of default and conducted a trustee's 
sale on the subject property later testify at a trial contesting the foreclosure where such 
trustee is a licensed attorney in Utah, who is highly experienced in foreclosures, and 
testified about his common practice regarding the recording a notice of default prior to 
the recording of the substitution of trustee in compliance with Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct and without violating Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Preserved: Trial, April 19, 2010; Findings and Conclusions, pp. 6-11. 
3. Is service of process by mail under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-807 to a 
foreclosed property subject to a complaint for eviction valid, where after the process 
server attempted three times to make personal service on the defendants, and then the 
district court ordered service by mail and subsequently mailed the summons and 
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complaint making service complete after three days from mailing? Preserved: Trial, 
April 19, 2010; Findings and Conclusions, p. 11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented raise only questions of law, reviewed for correctness, without 
deference to the views of the district court. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 69-70 
(Utah 1998); Robinson v. State, 20 P.3d 396, 398 (Utah 2007). 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-22(1): 
(1) (a) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record 
in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust property or some 
part of the trust property is situated, a substitution of trustee. 
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and title of the 
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee. 
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee, ratify 
and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee prior to the 
recording of the substitution of trustee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case comes to this Court on appeal after RM Lifestyles LLC & Woodbridge 
Realty LC ("Purchasers") filed a Complaint for Eviction against Bryan K. Ellison, Jamie 
Ellison and Commonwealth Properties, L.C. ("Ellison") on January 21, 2010. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") at 4, \ 13. The Complaint 
was based on Ellison's failure to vacate 4460 South 2700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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84124 ("premises") after Purchasers had bought the premises at a trustee's sale and 
served Ellison a five-day notice to vacate. Id. at 3-4, I^flf 11, 12. Ellison contested service 
was improper and filed a petition for emergency relief in which this Court denied. Id. at 
5, |^ 18. A trial was held on April 19, 2010 and the trial court filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law ruling that the foreclosure procedures taken were proper, and 
Purchasers were entitled to possession to the property and could sell it. Id. at 6, ^ f 1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellees incorporate the facts as found by the trial court and cited in Appellant's 
Brief. (Appellant's Brief, 7-12). However, Appellees contest the farther facts stated in 
Appellant's brief. Id. at 12-16. These facts are not supported by reference to the record 
pursuant Rule 24(a)(7) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellees do not incorporate 
any of those facts and specifically deny paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the further facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
§ 57-1-22 Utah Code Annotated ("U.CA.'*) allows a new trustee to act on behalf 
of a beneficiary prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee document, subject to 
ratification. This includes acts on behalf of the beneficiary prior to the execution of the 
substitution of trustee. A beneficiary may ratify a new trustee's recording of a notice of 
default prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee and prior to its execution. The 
trial court correctly concluded that eTitle, through Tom Cook, could record the notice of 
default prior to the recording and execution of the substitution of trustee and that National 
City could ratify that action in the substitution of trustee, making the trustee's sale valid. 
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It was proper for the trial court to hear the testimony of Tom Cook because he was 
not the advocate for the plaintiff. Cook's testimony assisted the trial court to determine 
the common practice for new trustee actions taken prior to recording the substitution of 
trustee. The testimony complied with Utah Rules of Evidence and Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
The trial court correctly found that service was proper and complete in the matter. 
Defendants failed to overcome the presumption that the process server acted diligently 
and truthfully in her three attempts to serve Defendants, and that the authorized service 
by mail was in accordance with U.C.A. § 78B-6-807. 
ARGUMENT 
I. U.C.A. § 57-1-22 PERMITS A NEW TRUSTEE TO RECORD A NOTICE 
OF DEFAULT PRIOR TO THE RECORDING AND EXECUTION OF THE 
SUBSTITUTION OF TRUSTEE DOCUMENT AS LONG AS THE ACTION 
IS RATIFIED. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the foreclosure procedure that took place on the 
subject premises was valid. The interpretation of U.C.A. § 57-1-22 is correct because it 
gave effect to the legislative intent. By looking at the plain language and legislative 
history, the trial court correctly determined that the notice of default and trustee's sale on 
the subject property was valid. Its interpretation of the statute is in harmony with related 
statutes. 
In interpreting a statute the "primary objective [...] is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent." LPIServs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41.1f 11, 215 P-3d 135. To discern 
legislative intent a court looks "first to the statute's plain language.'" Id. A court will 
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"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to 
its ordinary and accepted meaning/' Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ^ 
32. 164 P.3d 384. Additionally, the court will "read the plain language of [a] statute as a 
whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters." LPIServs., 2009 UT 41, f^ 11. If "the plain meaning of the statute can 
be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id "[I]f the 
language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to legislative history ... to 
ascertain the statute's intent." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, *h 47, 164 P.3d 384. 
A* The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Plain Language of U.C.A. § 57-
1-22 Is Proper Because It Gives Effect to the Legislative Intent. 
U.C.A. § 57-1-22's plain language indicates a new trustee may act on behalf of a 
beneficiary prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee provided the beneficiary 
ratifies and confirms the action by express provision in the substitution of trustee 
document. The trial court correctly interpreted the language to not limit the scope or time 
of the actions taken, including those taken before execution of the substitution of trustee 
document. (Findings and Conclusions, p. 9, % 1). Any other interpretation would render 
the ratification language meaningless and not give effect to legislative intent. eTitle and 
National City followed the statutory steps and met the objectives of trust deed laws in 
order to validly conduct a trustee's sale. 
U.C.A. § 57-l-22(l)(c) states: "The beneficiary may, by express provision in the 
substitution of trustee, ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the 
new trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee.'* U.C.A. § 57-l-22(l)(c). 
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The statute gives no definition of the words "ratify and confirm." However, as a 
starting point, Black's Law Dictionary defines "ratification" as "[a] binding adoption of 
an act already completed but [...] done by a third party having at the time no authority to 
act as the person's agent." Black's Law Dictionary 1046 (Abridged 8th Ed. 2005). In 
agency law, "[a] principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an agreement made by an 
unauthorized agent. Ratification of an agent's acts relates back to the time the 
unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient to create the relationship of principal and 
agent." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) "A deliberate and valid 
ratification with full knowledge of all the material facts is binding and cannot afterward 
be revoked or recalled." Id. "However, a ratification requires the principal to have 
knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." Id. 
In this case, National City followed subsection (l)(c) by expressly ratifying 
eTitle's past action of recording the notice of default. eTitle acted properly because 
National City asked it to commence the foreclosure having a knowledge of Ellison's 
default on the loan. (Findings and Conclusions, p. 2, <| 2). National City furthered its 
intent to ratify eTitle's action by placing an express provision of ratification in the 
substitution of trustee document. Id. at 2,^| 4. Both National City and eTitle complied 
with the ratification procedure under the statute because (1) National City ratified the 
recording of the notice of default by express provision in the substitution of trustee; (2) 
the action was on behalf of the beneficiary National City; and (3) it was prior to the 
recording of the substitution of trustee. Just as a principal may ratify an agent's actions, 
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so too did National City ratify eTitle's recording of the notice of default with full 
knowledge of the facts. 
The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 57-1-22 is in line with the plain 
language and gives meaning to the ratification subsection. The facts indicate that eTitle's 
recording of the notice of default, through Tom Cook, was valid because the beneficiary, 
National City, ratified and confirmed the action by express provision in the recorded 
substitution of trustee; and it was action "taken on the beneficiary's behalf." Any other 
interpretation of the statute in regards to eTitle and National City's action would render 
the ratification language meaningless. 
B. The Trial Court's Interpretation of U.C.A. § 57-1-22 Is Proper Because 
The Legislative History of the Statute Supports It 
Although there is no ambiguity with the language, the legislative history shows 
the Utah Legislature added U.C.A. § 57-l-22(l)(c) in a 2001 amendment in order for a 
beneficiary to ratify and confirm "any action" that occurred prior to the recording of the 
substitution of trustee document. National City ratified the recording of the notice of 
default, and the trial court's interpretation that the notice was valid is verified by the 
legislative history. 
The legislative history describing the 2001 amendments to U.C.A. § 57-1-22 state 
that subsection (l)(c) was added to allow "a beneficiary to include in the substitution of 
trustee language that ratifies any action taken by the new trustee prior to the recording of 
the substitution of trustee document." See Findings and Conclusions, p.7, ^ j la (quoting 
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S.B. 53, Second Substitute, 2001 Gen. Sess. Trust Deed Law Amendments, Bill Drafting 
& Research File, Drafts, Document 4, p. 97 of 262 (Utah 2001). 
"Any action" must include the recording of the notice of default by the new trustee 
prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. Also, anything prior to the recording 
of the substitution of trustee would include the time prior to the execution of the 
substitution of trustee. A new trustee could take no action that could be ratified if the 
trustee had to wait until execution of the substitution of trustee to act. The trial court 
correctly concluded that National City could ratify eTitle's recording of the notice of 
default, giving effect to the reason in adding the ratification language to the statute. 
C. The Trial Court's Interpretation of U.CA. § 57-1-22 Is Proper Because 
it is in Harmony with the Procedural Requirements of Trust Deed 
Law. 
The trial court interpreted U.CA. § 57-1-22 correctly because its interpretation is 
in harmony with trust deed law and notice requirements. The notice of default required 
under U.CA. § 57-1-24 met its objectives when recorded by eTitle because it provided 
Ellison information in order to protect their interests in the property. The recording of the 
notice of default complied with trust deed laws and the trial court's interpretation is in 
harmony with U.CA. § 57-1-24. 
The "detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real property are 
intended to protect the debtor/trustor." Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. 
Mehi% 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "The objective of the notice requirements 
is to protect the rights of those with an interest in the property to be sold. The sufficiency 
of the notice or the validity of a subsequent sale will not be affected by immaterial errors 
and mistakes if those objectives are met." Id. Generally a trustee's sale is only set aside 
for "irregularity, want of notice, or fraud if there is evidence sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of its validity." Id. at 221. 
In Occidental, this Court held that the pre-sale procedures taken were adequate to 
validate a trustee's sale even though the initial notice of default failed to describe fully 
and correctly the property to be foreclosed. Id. at 221. The Court looked at U.C.A. § 57-
1-24 which requires a notice of default to be recorded prior to the exercise of sale. The 
notice of default served the function of alerting "those with an interest in the trust 
property of impending foreclosure." Id. at 220. The trustor failed to show that the 
procedural irregularity resulted from fraud or unfair dealing or that the interests of the 
debtor had been infringed. Id. at 221. "The steps taken afforded all parties the rights and 
protections the statutory requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure were intended to 
ensure." Id. 
In this case, the notice of default met the function of providing Ellison the 
informational objectives of impending foreclosure. Reversing the trial court would 
improperly have the effect of setting aside a valid trustee's sale, and should not be done. 
The notice of default and trustee's sale were valid because no irregularity, want of notice, 
or fraud to show unfair dealing towards Ellison occurred. eTitle, through Tom Cook, had 
the right under U.C.A. § 57-1-22 to record the notice of default prior to the recording of 
the substitution of trustee, subject to ratification. Through the notice of default, Ellison 
was apprised of the impending foreclosure because of their default. The notice of default 
was valid because it met its informational objectives and did not infringe any of Ellison's 
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interests. National City and eTitle took all the proper procedural requirements under trust 
deed law to protect Ellison. The steps taken afforded Ellison the protections the statutory 
requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure were intended to ensure. 
The trial court correctly based its conclusion on the plain language of the statute, 
its legislative history, and the common practice of a Utah attorney and trustee. (Findings 
and Conclusions, p. 6, ^ [ 1). The interpretation is in harmony with the procedural 
requirements set forth in the trust deed laws. 
D. The Trial Court's Interpretation of U.C.A. § 57-1-22 is Proper Because 
It Does Not Conflict with U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5's Restrictions on 
Delegation of Trustee Duties. 
A new trustee may take actions, such as recording a notice of default, to 
commence foreclosure proceedings prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. 
eTitle, through Tom Cook, validly recorded the notice of default under U.C.A. § 57-1-
22(1 )(c) which allows for actions on behalf of the beneficiary that are later ratified and 
confirmed in the substitution of trustee. No delegation of trustee powers occurred because 
eTitle never became a delegate of the original trustee, but acted on behalf of the 
beneficiary and was appointed new trustee under U.C.A. § 57-1-22. 
U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5 prohibits delegation of "the preparation and execution of: (i) 
the notice of default and election to sell [...]" U.C.A. § 57-l-21.5(l)(a)(i). " '[Delegation 
is the transfer of duties.' " First American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 
743 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1987) (internal citation omitted). It "involves the appointment 
of another to perform one's duties." Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 
557F.2d918(2ndCir. 1977). 
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Here, the original trustee never delegated to eTitle its duty to prepare and execute 
the notice of default in violation of U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5. The recording of the notice of 
default occurred by way of referral from the beneficiary, National City, to record the 
notice of default. (Findings and Conclusions, p. 2, ^ f 2). National City was not delegating 
its own duties to eTitle but directly authorized eTitle to perform a function on its behalf 
which it later ratified and confirmed in the substitution of trustee under U.C.A. § 57-1-
22(1 )(c). 
Under U.C.A. § 57-1-22, as the trial court correctly concluded, the beneficiary 
appoints and authorizes a new trustee to act on its behalf See (Findings and Conclusions, 
p. 8). No delegation of trustee duties occurred because the original trustee did not ask 
eTitle to perform its duties in preparing and executing the notice of default. Instead, 
through the ratification power of subsection (l)(c), National City approved the recording 
of the notice of default by eTitle, through Tom Cook, as the new trustee. 
eTitle, through Tom Cook, properly acted on behalf of the beneficiary, National 
City, without violating U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5. National City authorized eTitle to act on its 
behalf, and no delegation from one trustee to another occurred. The action of eTitle was 
later ratified in writing in the substitution of trustee. 
E. The Trial Court's Interpretation of U.C.A. § 57-1-22 is Proper Because 
The Statute of Frauds Does Not Require a Writing for a New Trustee 
to Take Action Ratified in The Substitution of Trustee. 
eTitle, through Tom Cook, validly recorded the notice of default because National 
City ratified and confirmed this act under U.C.A. § 57-l-22(l)(c). This did not violate the 
Statute of Frauds because, as the trial court correctly stated, the contractual relationship 
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between eTitle and National City, which is the basis of the substitution of trustee, is a 
collections contract not subject to the statute. If the statute of frauds were applied, it was 
met because National City ratified the recording of the notice of default in the 
substitution of trustee document and the notice of default was recorded pursuant an "act 
or operation of law." 
The Utah Statute of Frauds provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, [...] nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same [...] 
U.CA. §25-5-1. 
In recording the notice of default, eTitle acted under authorization from National 
City to begin to collect the amount owed by Ellison. This authority does not invoke the 
coverage of the Statute of Frauds because eTitle is acting on behalf of National City to 
collect a debt and does not create a "power over or concerning real property." eTitle acted 
on National City's behalf to collect a debt, action that was ratified in the substation of 
trustee document. 
If the statute of frauds were to apply, it was met because eTitle acted under the 
authority of U.C.A. § 57-l-22(l)(c) in recording the notice of default which is an "act or 
operation of law" meeting the statute of frauds. Further, the substitution of trustee 
document was executed and recorded naming eTitle as the new trustee and that its 
previous acts were ratified. 
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The statute of frauds does not apply to the relationship based on the substitution of 
trustee is a collections relationship. Even if the statute does apply, National City and 
eTitle satisfied the statue through acts pursuant law under U.C.A. § 57-1-22 and the 
substitution of trustee document. 
II. THE TESTIMONY OF TOM COOK WAS PROPER BECAUSE IT 
COMPLIED WITH THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
A. Tom Cook's Testimony Was Admissible and Did not Violate Rule 3.7 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct Because He was not the Advoeate 
at Trial. 
The trial court properly admitted the testimony of Tom Cook. Tom Cook did not 
act as the advocate for the plaintiff at trial but testified as to his common practice with 
regards to U.C.A. § 57-1-22(1). 
The pertinent part of Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states, 
"[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness.'* Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.7(a). 
Here, the lawyer acting as advocate at the trial was James Deans. Tom Cook was 
not advocating for the plaintiff, but testified how7 his common practice changed when 
U.C.A. § 57-1-22 was amended in 2001. Although Mr. Cook did record the notice of 
default, Rule 3.7 does not apply to him because he is not the advocate for the plaintiff at a 
trial in which he might be a necessary witness. 
There was no violation of Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
because the witness, Tom Cook, was not the advocate at trial that would be a necessary 
witness. 
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B. Tom Cook's Testimony was Admissible and Did not Violate Rule 702 
of Utah Rules of Evidence Because He Testified as a Lay Witness. 
The trial court properly admitted testimony of Tom Cook. Mr. Cook testified as a 
lay witness, based on personal knowledge in the case, in order to determine how the 
foreclosure procedure took place in compliance with Rule 701 Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Even if the testimony is considered expert testimony, the testimony assisted the judge 
regarding an issue of fact as to how Tom Cook changed his common practice for 
recording a notice of default after the 2001 amendment to U.C.A. § 57-1-22 complying 
with Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness1 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert [...] may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." " The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of 
discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing 
of abuse, this court will not reverse.' " Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996) 
(internal citation omitted); see also Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 
920, 923 (Utah 1990) ("In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, 
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deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings 
regarding admissibility will not be overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the lower 
court was in error/ " (quoting State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986))). 
Tom Cook properly testified as a lay witness because his testimony was rationally 
based on his perceptions, helpful to determine facts in issue, and not based on scientific, 
technical, or specialized knowledge. Tom Cook was the person who recorded the notice 
of default and thus had personal knowledge to that fact. (Findings and Conclusions, p. 2, 
\ 3). His testimony regarded rationally based perceptions on his involved conduct with 
the foreclosure regarding when the notice of default had been recorded and whether that 
action had been ratified in the substitution of trustee. 
Also, the common practice of Tom Cook was a question of fact amenable to his 
testimony at trial. The trial court found through the testimony that after the 2001 
amendment to U.C.A. § 57-1-22(1) Tom Cook, as a trustee, "often records the notice of 
default prior to recording the substitution of trustee." (Findings and Conclusions, p. 8). 
Mr. Cook's experience in foreclosures and his involvement in this case allowed him to 
testify to determine a fact in issue regarding his common practice. Id. The question of 
law, whether a notice of default actually can be recorded prior to the substitution of 
trustee under § 57-1-22, was left to the trial court to determine. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Mr. Cook. 
He testified to assist the judge regarding the common practice he took after the 2001 
amendment. It was within the discretion of the court to hear this testimony making no 
clear error apparent to make the judgment indefensible. Even if it was error to admit it, 
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the error was harmless. "Harmless errors are those that are sufficiently inconsequential so 
no reasonable likelihood exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, 214 P.3d 865 (Utah App. 2009) 
III. SERVICE WAS PROPER IN THE CASE BECAUSE ELLISON FAILED 
TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF THE SERVER'S GOOD 
FAITH EFFORTS AND SERVICE BY MAIL COMPLIED WITH U.C.A. § 
78B-6-807(4). 
The trial court correctly found service was proper because it complied with U.C.A. 
§ 78B-6-807. The trial court had found cause to order service by mail after it found that 
the process server had attempted service three times at the property. The ordered service 
by mail was completed three days after mailing. 
Under unlawful detainer law, "[t]he court may authorize sendee by publication or 
mail for cause shown." U.C.A. § 78B-6-807(4). "Service by mail is complete three days 
after mailing." U.C.A. § 78B-6-807(6). 
Unlike Rule 4(d)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, 
"[s]ervice by mail or commercial courier sendee shall be complete on the date the receipt 
is signed [...]," service under the Unlawful Detainer Statute is complete three days after 
mailing. There is no requirement for the person served to sign a receipt. Because this is a 
statute enacted by the Utah Legislature, it governs and supersedes Rule 4 of Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The plain language of the statute indicates service is complete three 
days after mailing. "Mailing" has the ordinary meaning of placing in a post office or 
mailbox for transmission, not actual receipt. No other meaning should be given. 
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In this case, a cause showing was made in order for the court to authorize sendee 
by mail because there were ''three failed attempts to serve the Ellisons at the Property." 
(Findings and Conclusions, p. 4. ^ j 14). The Complaint was mailed (placed in the mail for 
transmission) by the district court on February 3. 2010 to the subject premises making it 
complete three days after on February 65 2010 pursuant U.C.A. § 78B-6-807(6). Id. 
Ellison's attorney, Mr. Smay. also received the complaint on February 10, 2010 giving 
him notice of the action. Id. at \ 15. The Ellison's were represented at a subsequent 
hearing on March 5, 2010 that found that service by mail was proper. Id. at ^ f 16. 
Sendee was proper in the case because the trial court found cause to order service 
by mail to the premises. The sendee, pursuant the statute, was complete after three days 
of mailing it. 
CONCLUSION 
RM Lifestyles & Woodbridge Realty7 LLC respectfully request this Court affirm 
the trial court's ruling. The trial court correctly concluded that eTitle could act on behalf 
of National City by recording a notice of default prior to the recording of the substitution 
of trustee making the trustee's sale valid; that the testimony of Tom Cook was 
permissible; and that sendee was proper. 
The decision below correctly interpreted the relevant law and should be affirmed. 
DATED this 13th day of December. 2010. 
JAMS HT DEANS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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